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MA1111 LAW QUARTERLY
a short skirt," and similar cynical maledictions. But, as Mark Twain said
about the weather, everybody talks about it, but nobody does anything
about it. Perhaps Judge Frank's caricature may incite people to action.
Most readers will be impressed by the author's intelligent criticism of
our legal system and his bold suggestions for legal reforms. They will be even
more impressed by his style af writing and the scope of his inquiry. Judge
Frank's fluent style of writing (accentuated by vicious invectives, sterling
similes, meteoric metaphors, and perhaps unconsciously hypercritical hyper-
boles), combined with his phenomenal erudition in a myriad of subjects,
and interspersed with good sense and nonsense, give this book a satirical,
titilating tingle like that of a Gilbert and Sullivan operetta.
GEORGE W. STENGEL PROFESSOR OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS. By Mitchell Wendell.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1949. Pp. 298. $4.00.
To many it is familiar learning that the pronouncements of the United
States Supreme Court indicating the instances in which federal courts
exercising a concurrent jurisdiction with local state courts in which they
apply state law, may or may not reach results at variance with those of the
local state courts, have deep governmental as well as legal significations;
and each of these meanings draws substance from the other. Lawyers who
fail to see beyond the legal dogma in these decisions to their meaning in
terms of division of governmental power, take a myopic and one-sided view
of the judicial process which can result only in an incomplete under-
standing of the law. Political scientists who do not understand the pragmatic
relations of these legal dogmas to our federal system of government can
hardly understand that government, for in a real sense the nature of our
government is largely what it is because the judicial evaluations and policies
behind these dogmas have made it so.
Mitchell Wendell's Relations Between the Federal and State Courts.
No. 555 of the Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, edited by
the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University, assumes that
while political scientists are familiar with the governmental significance of
judicial decisions interpreting the due process and commerce clauses of the
United States Constitution, most of them do not understand the importance
to the science of government of the judicial decisions in the field which
lawyers commonly describe as federal jurisdiction and procedure. They do
not even recognize that there exists- any connection at all between such
decisions and the science of government. The author finds that most political
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scientists "are not familiar with the more technical aspects of law" and
"have been led to assume that the bulk of the litigation in the lower federal
courts and in the state courts has little or nothing to teach us about the
nature and operation of our federal system."' The misconception of political
scientists entertaining this view should be corrected. Having found that the
researches of the legal profession are inadequate for this purpose because
they "seldom treat judicial federalism in such a way as to bring out its
governmental significance," 2 Dr. Wendell offers this study "in the hope of
shedding some light on this neglected phase of our judicial federalism." 3
As an extra contribution unannounced in the author's prefatory statement
of purpose, Dr. Wendell offers to the reader the benefits of his appraisal
of the dual judicial system and a suggestion for the solution of problems
created by the exercise of the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts.
In law and politics, as in archaeology, the location, breadth and depth
of an excavation is properly determined by what the explorer hopes to
expose. The success or failure of the expedition must be judged by whether
the explorer has exposed what he sought to expose. Mitchell Wendell's
intellectual excavations are well adapted to their purpose. The author's
topical outline of the subject adequately covers the field. On the whole, his
analysis and selection of cases illustrating by type the situations in which
problems arise of dividing governmental power between state and nation,
is good. In presenting the cases, the author does not always content him-
self with merely stating the facts, the decision, and the significance of the
decision to the science of government, but, in addition, frequently makes
critical appraisals of these decisions from the standpoint of a political scien-
tist. Understanding of the cases discussed and the discussions is facilitated
by historical summaries which, as in the case of the summary of the develop-
ment of the dual system of courts and law enforcements, 4 the author uses
to gocd.effect to introduce the reader to major topics. As an introduction to
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, there is a valuable survey and discussion of the
cases decided before Swift v. Tyson and after Swift v. Tyson to the Erie
case, in which the author brings out the economic as well as the political
factors behind the decisions,' thus illuminating the Erie problem from an
angle that is frequently neglected. Also helpful to understanding is the
author's talent for lucidity of expression and conciseness of statement. It
is believed that no political scientist who has read this book can leave it







much to do with shaping the contours of our federal system of government;
that Dr. Wendell has exposed what he sought to expose; and that his
intellectual expedition is therefore a success.
In the final chapter of his book, Dr. Wendell makes an appraisal of
the dual judicial system and attempts to answer the question of how juris-
diction should be divided between state and federal courts. He believes
that the dual judicial system is highly desirable because of the need for
effective legal administration, to insure against frustration of federal poli-
cy by misinterpretation in local courts, and for state control over the content
of state law.6 Dr. Wendell concludes that the only serious difficulty with the
present division of judicial labor between nation and states is to be found in
the exercise of the diversity jurisdiction I of the federal courts. His main
argument is that the exercise of that jurisdiction produces inequities re-
sulting from the opportunities afforded for forum shopping and that while
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins swept away the worst features of the Tyson rule,
there still is substantial room for this type of legal maneuvering. The author's
position is summarized in the following statements:
Since Erie v. Tompkins and the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the all-important question has become whether something is substance or
procedure. If it belongs to the former category, national courts will
follow state decisions; if the dispute is over a matter in the latter cate-
gory, the federal judiciary will not apply state law but will follow its
own rules.'
In practice. .. these differences in procedural rules can be of the
utmost importance.9
Differences in federal and state procedural law encourage litigants to
shop for the forum before which they are likely to make their best show-
ing in much the same way that they were accustomed to do when Swift v,
Tyson held out the promise of different interpretations of substar.tive
law.10
Dr. Wendell agrees that there is a need to protect litigating non-resi-
dents against local prejudice." He must therefore make a choice of sacri-
6. "Nor is the need for effective legal administration the only reason for the existence
of separate federal and state courts. The provisions of appeal to the Supreme Court in
cases involving federal law contained in the Constitution and the first Judiciary Act
demonstrate an early recognition shat some insurance against frustration of federal policy
by misinterpretation in local courts is necessary. The need for state control over the con-
tent of local law is equally as great." P. 287.
7. "The only serious difficulty without present division of judicial labor between





11. "Undoubtedly there is need to protect a limited number of suitors against the
local prejudice which forms the only reasonable justification for diversity jurisdiction."
P. 289.
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fices between the need for removing the inequities of forum shopping and
the need for protecting litigating non-residents against local prejudice.
Whereas most opponents of the diversity jurisdiction choose to sacrifice
the need for protecting litigating non-residents against local prejudice and
favor complete elimination of diversity jursdiction, mainly because there are
practical difficulties preventing its satisfactory modification, and the damage
done by diversity jurisdiction outweighs the gains accruing from the sys-
tem, Dr. Wendell opposes complete elimination. He proposes that Congress
drastically restrict the operations of the federal judiciary in diversity cases
to the specific situations needing attention for protection of litigating non-
residents against local prejudice," but he does not undertake to offer any
suggestion for satisfactorily separating these legal goats from the sheep.
It is an oversimplification to say that since Erie R.R. v. Tompkins the
all-important question has become whether something is substance or
procedure, and this is as true when the statement is applied to cases decided
after enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as those decided be-
fore their enactment. Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co."3
teaches that the "something" which must be evaluated for the purpose of
determining the applicability of the Erie doctrine in a case involving both
a state law and a differing provision of the federal rules covering the same
subject, is not the provision of the federal rules but the state law; that the
court's approach is not different where a provision of the federal rules is
involved from where some other type of judicial pronouncement is involved;
that it is not different in cases decided after enactment of the federal rules
from cases decided before their enactment.'
4
12. "However, the needs of this group, insofar as the federal court may possibly
afford them a haven from hostile local sentiment, could be served by a much more nar-
rowly drawn diversity statute that would apply specifically to the situations needing
attention." P. 289. "Congress ... by regulating the jurisdiction of the federal courts can
restrict the operation of our federal judiciary to areas of genuine national concern." P.
290.
13. 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
14. In the Ragan case the facts were these: under Kansas law, highway accident
suits are barred if suit is not commenced within two years. An action is deemed "com-
menced" at "the date of the summons." Rule 39 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that "a civil action is commenced hy filing a complaint with the court." A
highway accident occured in Kansas on Oct. 1, 1943. A complaint was filed in the Fed-
eral District Court for Kansas on September 4, 1945. Summons was not served until
December 28, 1945. The court held that the action could not be maintained in the federal
court because it could not be maintained in the local state court. The case turned on an
evaluation of the Kansas statute rather than Federal Rule 23. The valuation was made
on the basis of the effect on the cause of action in the particular case of a failure to apply
the Kansas statute concerning commencement of actions. It was found that failure to apply
it would give the cause of action longer life in the federal court than it would have in
the state court. "We may not do that consistently with Erie R.R. v. Tompkins." Justice
Douglas' approach was not substantially different in this case, than in Palmer v. Hoffman
318 U.S. 109 (1943), which involved conflicting rules as to burden of proof of contribu-
tory negligence.
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Whether the "something" in state law is or is not within the scope
of the Erie doctrine is dependent upon something much deeper than the
question whether it is substance or procedure. For reasons pointed out by
Walter Wheeler Cook seventeen years ago,' 5 it is a mistake to reason from
the assumption that there is a clean-cut line of division between these cate-
gories, or, that within the idea of substance and/or procedure, as these
terms have been used, there are invariable elements with which such a
line can be drawn when applied to undifferentiated material. Neither Justice
Rutledge nor Justice Reed, both of whom have indicated in their dissents
a preference for explaining their views in terms of substance or procedure,'6
has claimed that such a line had been drawn, or that either concept contains
such invariable elements. In Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York,'
7
the inutility of the substance-procedure test as a criterion of the scope
of the Erie doctrine was pointed out and this test rejected in the opinion for
the majority of the court. In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corpora-
tion,18 Justice Jackson, speaking for the majority, indicated that there may
be cases where the Erie doctrine is applicable even when the state law is
admittedly procedural.' 9 The doctrine has been held by the Court to be
applicable to such state statutes sounding in procedure as a statute requir-
ing complainant stockholders in certain derivative actions to give security
for the reasonable expenses, including counsel fees, which may be incurred
by the corporate defendant; 20 a statute specifying that an action is com-
menced when summons is served;21 and a statute providing that a foreign
corporation may not sue in the courts of the state unless it has qualified to
do business. 2 While the words substance and procedure are convenient
symbols frequently used in discussion as suggestive superscriptions, their
use in the Erie-type cases confuses the issue by concealing the crux of the
matter which is that it is the effect on particular litigation of the applica-
tion or non-application of a particular state law, and not the character of
the law applied, which is the all-important question in determining whether
Erie applies. 23
Fears that the Erie doctrine leaves substantial room for Swift v. Tyson-
15. Cook, Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333 (1933).
16. For Justice Rutledge's view see his dissent in Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945)1 for Justice Reed's view see his dissent in Angel v. Bullington,
330 U.S. 183 (1947).
17. See note 16 supra.
18. 337 U.S, 541 (1949).
19. "Even if we were to determine that the New Jersey Statute is procedural, it
would not determine that it is not applicable. Rules which lawyers call procedural do not
always exhaust their effect by regulating procedure." See note 18 supra at 555.
20. Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corporation, supra.
21. Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., stupra.
22. Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
2 3. This illustrated by the Ragan case, supra.
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type evasion of state law by shopping for important preceptive advantages
thought to be obtainable under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure find
no basis in anything the United States Supreme Court has said or done. The
theory advanced in the majority opinion in the Guaranty Trust case24 that
in adjudicating state-created rights solely because of the diversity of citi-
zenship of the parties, a federal court is in effect "only another court of
the State," gave notice that such forum shopping as a policy of lawyers
handling litigation is frowned upon by the Court and is not likely to be
productive of an advantage substantially affecting the enforcement of the
right given by the state. Reaffirmance of this theory in Antgel v. Bullington"
and more recently in Wood v. Interstate Realty,2 6 serves to re-emphasize
the point. While Justice Frankfurter, who wrote the majority opinion in
the Guaranty Trust case, 7 never did succeed in persuading all the members
of the court to accept the theory advanced by him in that case, all decisions
of the Court subsequent to the Guaranty Trust case are consistent with
its theory. In none of these cases has the Court permitted a litigant to insti-
tute proceedings in a federal court, circumvent a state law imposing re-
strictions or liabilities in the enforcement of a state created right, and
obtain the benefits of a more lenient provision of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. In Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co.,21 where
such a maneuver was attempted, the Court refused to apply a provision of
the federal rules differing from the correlative state law and reached the
same result that would have been reached if suit had been instituted in
the local state court.
This is not to say that there may not be cases where the Supreme Court
will sanction application of the federal rules in preference to state laws
differing from such rules on the same subject. The existence of such cases
is assumed by Justice Frankfurter in the Guaranty Trust case,29 by Justices
Douglas and Frankfurter in their dissent-in-part in the Ragan case,30 and
24. See note 16 supra.
25. Ibid.
26. See note 22 supra.
27. See note 16 supra.
28. See note 13 supra.
29. "When, because the plaintiff happens to be a nonresident, such a right is en-
forceable in a federal as well as in a State court, the forms, and mode of enforcing the
right may at times, naturally enough, vary because the two judicial systems are not
identic." See note 16 supra at 108.
30. In his dissent in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation, supra, in which
Justice Frankfurter concurred, Justice Douglas was of the opinion that Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules should have been applied and not the New Jersey statute which the
majority held applicable.
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by Justices Jackson and Burton in their dissent in the Woods case. ' But
if there are cases where the differing federal rules will be applied, we are
left in the dark as to what a majority of the court would agree on as being
their distinguishing characteristics. The facts gleaned from the majority
and dissenting opinions in the cases which refuse to apply the federal rules
would seem to justify the conclusion that it is unlikely that the Court will
prefer to give effect to a federal rule rather than to the correlative state law
except, perhaps, (a) where the federal rule is less advantageous to the non-
resident than the state law, or (b) the difference between the correlative
state and federal rules does not substantially affect establishment or
enforcement of the state-created right.
In conclusion it may be pointed out that it is unlikely that a diversity
jurisdiction which has survived, in modified form, the pre-Erie attacks of
opponents striking with arguments built around powerful existing evils,
will succumb to substantially the same arguments now made by propo-
nents of modification after the worst features of these evils have been re-
moved. If it is desirable to eliminate even the unsubstantial inequities of
forum shopping in these cases, may not implementation of the Guaranty
Trust theory by cooperative state and national legislation for the purpose
of eliminating differences in rule, be preferable as a solution to drastic
curtailment of the diversity jurisdiction?
GEORGE H. PICKAR PROFESSOR OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI
THE SEXUAL CRIMINAL. By J. Paul de River. Springfield: Charles C. Thomas,
1949. Pp- 281. $5.50.
THE author of this book states that it is intended primarily for those
who are interested in knowing the sexual psychopath. Ostensibly, the author
is desirous of making clear the dynamics underlying abnormal sexual be-
havior, for the subtitle of the book indicates that he employs the psycho-
analytic method in the study of sexual deviants.
As far as this reviewer can see, the present volume has little to recom-
mend it. In none of the case histories presented is there adequate material
to give the reader anything at all approaching an understanding of the psy-
chological motivation underlying sexual crimes. The sexual offense itself
31. In his dissent in Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., supra, in which Justices Burton
and Rutledge joined, Justice Jackson was of the opinion that a Mississippi statute denying
to a foreign corporation which had not qualified to do business in the state the right to
sue in any of the courts of the state should not be construed so as to deny to the corpora-
tion the right to sue in the federal courts.
